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Abstract
Network coding achieves optimal throughput in multicast networks. However, throughput opti-
mality relies on the network nodes or routers to code correctly. A Byzantine node may introduce
junk packets in the network (thus polluting downstream packets and causing the sinks to receive the
wrong data) or may choose coding coefficients in a way that significantly reduces the throughput of
the network.
Most prior work focused on the problem of Byzantine nodes polluting packets. However, even if a
Byzantine node does not pollute packets, he can still affect significantly the throughput of the network
by not coding correctly. No previous work attempted to verify if a certain node coded correctly using
random coefficients over all of the packets he was supposed to code over.
We provide two novel protocols (which we call PIP and Log-PIP) for detecting whether a node coded
correctly over all the packets received (i.e., according to a random linear network coding algorithm).
Our protocols enable any node in the network to examine a packet received from another node by
running a “verification test”. With our protocols, the worst an adversary can do and still pass the
packet verification test is in fact equivalent to random linear network coding, which has been shown
to be optimal in multicast networks. Our protocols resist collusion among nodes and are applicable to
a variety of settings.
Our topology simulations show that the throughput in the worst case for our protocol is two to
three times larger than the throughput in various adversarial strategies allowed by prior work. We
implemented our protocols in C/C++ and Java, as well as incorporated them on the Android platform
(Nexus One). Our evaluation shows that our protocols impose modest overhead.
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1 Introduction
Network coding was first proposed by Ahlswede et al. [ACLY00], who demonstrated that, for certain
networks, network coding can produce a higher throughput than the best routing strategy. A subsequent
line of work that includes the works of Koetter et al. [KM03], Li et al. [LYC03], and Jaggi et al. [JSC+05]
showed that random linear coding reaches maximum throughput for multicast networks. Overall, network
coding has proved better than routing for both wired and wireless networks and for both multicast and
broadcast [NS08]; it has also found applications to increasing the robustness and throughput of peer-to-
peer networks (e.g., [GR05]) and to a variety of sensor wireless networks as surveyed by Narmawala and
Srivastava [NS08].
Throughput optimality requires diversity. The throughput guarantees of network coding, however,
rely on the assumption that all the nodes in the network code correctly, i.e., each node in the network, when
receiving packets, is assumed to transmit a packet that is a random linear combination of the incoming
packets; informally, packets that are indeed linear combinations of the incoming packets are said to be
valid, and packets that are random linear combinations of the incoming packets are said to be diverse.
The assumption that each node in the network codes correctly may not hold because the network may
contain Byzantine nodes, who are malicious or faulty nodes. For example, a Byzantine node may change
the payload or the coding vector in a way that is not a linear combination of the received packets, thereby
transmitting an invalid (or polluted) packet. The invalid packet will mix with other packets and thus
pollute more packets, ultimately causing the decoded information at the sinks to be incorrect.
In fact, a Byzantine node can transmit a valid packet (i.e., a linear combination of the received packets),
but still manage to decrease the overall throughput at the sinks. The Byzantine node could choose
coefficients for the linear combination in a way that is not random: the node could forward one of the
packets (by simply routing), code over only a subset of the packets, or, even worse, choose coefficients
that do not contribute any new information to his receivers, thus, effectively sending nothing. While the
network is not polluted by such a Byzantine node (and the decoded information at the sinks is still valid),
the throughput of the network is decreased. In Section 6, as an example, we show that such Byzantine
nodes can indeed reduce the throughput to as much as a half or a third in some specific cases and as
much as 20% on random topologies. Figure 1 shows a simple example of 50% throughput reduction on
the standard butterfly topology.
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Figure 1: Example of throughput reduction caused by a Byzantine node on a butterfly
network: (a) if node N1 is honest, he will send A + B, thus allowing both N2 and N3 to
recover both A and B; (b) if node N1 is Byzantine, he may choose to send only A, thus
halving the throughput at N2, which can now recover only A.
Insufficiency of prior work to guarantee correctness. A significant body of previous work that
includes [KFM04], [CJL06], [GR06], [GR06], [ZKMH07], [YWRG08], [HLK+08], [JLK+08], [BFKW09],
[KTT09], [AB09], [DCNR09], [ABBF10], [LM10], [YSJL10], and [WVNK10] addressed the problem of
defending against pollution attacks, where the goal is to enforce or check that the packets sent by each
node to be some (not necessarily random) linear combination of the packets sent by the source. Most prior
work on enforcing validity of packets has focused on detecting polluted packets right at the point where
a Byzantine node injected them into the network [BFKW09], [ZKMH07], [KFM04], [YWRG08], [CJL06],
and [ABBF10]: when a Byzantine node injects an invalid packet into the network, the node receiving the
packet is able to detect if the packet is invalid by running a test, and can discard the invalid packet right
away.
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However, all such work does not detect Byzantine nodes that deviate from random linear coding of the
received packets, thus allowing such Byzantine nodes to reduce throughput as already discussed above.
In particular, Byzantine nodes are still allowed to simply forward a received packet (rather than to code
over multiple packets) or use coefficients that provide no new degrees of freedom to downstream nodes,
effectively sending no data.
Our result. Given that Byzantine nodes may significantly affect the throughput of the network, we
believe that it is important to study the following problem:
How to force a node to code correctly?
(That is, to code both validly and randomly, over all the received packets.)
Our main contribution is a novel protocol for enabling each child of a node to detect whether the node
coded correctly over all the packets he was supposed to code over (i.e., according to a random linear
network coding algorithm). In our protocol, a child node C of a node N (where child means that C receives
data from his parent N) can check, by running a verification test, that the data from N is the result of
correctly coding over the packets N receives from his parents. The node C need only examine the packet
received from N and does not need to know the precise packet payloads used in coding at N.
Let the required set of N, denoted RN, be the subset of the parents of N that N is expected to code
over. As we will discuss in Section 5, the exact definition of the required set depends on the application;
the flexibility in defining it will enable our protocols to be applicable to a variety of settings. For example,
some applications may require a node to code over the packets from all his parents; other applications,
perhaps due to unreliability of the communication channel, may require nodes to code over at least some
minimum number of parents.
Using our protocols presented in Section 4, the child node C can ensure that:
(i) the packet from N is the result of coding over the packets from all the nodes in RN, and
(ii) the coding coefficients used by N are pseudorandom.
We provide two algorithms, with two different kinds of guarantees: Payload-Independent-Protocol (PIP)
and Log-Verification PIP (Log-PIP). PIP always detects if N failed to code over all the packets from parents
in the required set, whereas Log-PIP detects such a violation with an adjustable probability. In cases where
nodes can have many parents (say, more than 10), Log-PIP is faster and more bandwidth efficient. While
we use pseudorandom coefficients instead of random ones, this does not affect the throughput guarantees
of network coding (see Section 4.5); accordingly, we will use the two terms interchangeably in this paper.
Furthermore, our protocols are resistant to collusion among nodes: even if the two Byzantine nodes
N and C collude, the other honest children of N can still check whether N coded correctly over any non-
colluding parents.
Finally, we assume that there exist penalties for nodes that are found to send incorrect packets, and we
assume that they drive incentives against cheating in a detectable manner. A discussion of the exact form
of such penalties of course lies outside of the scope of this paper, and one should choose the penalty that is
best fit for one’s application. To facilitate the use of a penalty system, though, our protocol enables nodes
to prove (and not only detect) that a parent cheated (i.e., did not code correctly); moreover, Byzantine
nodes cannot falsely accuse honest nodes of not coding correctly.
Thus, we assume that Byzantine nodes will not cheat in a detectable way. We therefore consider an
adversarial model in which Byzantine nodes perform the worst possible action to pass the verification test.
In Section 4.8, we prove that the worst an adversary can do and still pass our packet verification tests is to
code correctly (i.e., according to a random linear network coding scheme), which has been shown to give
optimal throughput in multicast networks.
Implementation and evaluation. Our simulations in Section 6 show that the throughput in the best
adversarial strategy for our protocol is two to three times larger than the throughput in several adversarial
strategies allowed by prior work.
We implemented our protocols in C/C++. We also wrote a Java implementation for Java-based P2P
applications and an Android package for smartphone P2P file sharing. Our C/C++ evaluations show that
the protocols are reasonably efficient: the running time at a node to prepare for transmitting the data is
less than 0.3 ms, and the time to perform a verification test is 3.7 ms with PIP and 1.4 ms with Log-PIP.
Compared to the overhead introduced by a pollution detection scheme that we analyzed [BFKW09], the
additional overheads introduced by our two protocols are respectively less than 2% for PIP and less than
0.5% for Log-PIP. This suggests that, if one is already using a pollution detection scheme, then additionally
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enforcing diversity of packets will not affect performance by much. Moreover, the overhead of both of our
protocols is independent of how large the packet payload is.
2 Related Work
Ahlswede et al. [ACLY00] have pioneered the field of network coding. They showed the value of coding
at routers and provided theoretical bounds on the capacity of such networks. Works such as those of
Koetter et al. [KM03], Li et al. [LYC03], and Jaggi et al. [JSC+05] show that, for multicast traffic, linear
codes achieve maximum throughput, while coding and decoding can be done in polynomial time. Ho et
al. [HKM+03] show that random network coding can also achieve maximum network capacity. Network
coding has been shown to improve throughput in a variety of networks: wireless [LMK05], peer-to-peer
content distribution [GR05], energy [WNE00], distributed storage [Jia06], and others.
Despite its throughput benefits, however, network coding is susceptible to Byzantine attacks. A Byzan-
tine node can inject into the network junk packets, which will mix with correct packets and generate more
junk packets, thus resulting in junk data at the sink.
A significant amount of research aims to prevent against or recover from pollution attacks [KFM04],
[CJL06], [GR06], [GR06], [ZKMH07], [YWRG08], [HLK+08], [JLK+08], [BFKW09], [KTT09], [AB09],
[DCNR09], [ABBF10], [LM10], [YSJL10], and [WVNK10]. Ho et al. [HLK+08] attempt to detect at the
sinks if the packets have been modified by a Byzantine node. They do so by adding hash symbols that
are obtained as a polynomial function of the data symbols, and pollution is indicated by an inconsistency
between the packets and the hashes.
Jaggi et al. [JLK+08], for example, discuss rate-optimal protocols that survive Byzantine attacks.
Their idea is to append extra parity information to the source messages. Kosut et al. [KTT09] provide
non-linear protocols for achieving capacity in the presence of Byzantine adversaries.
There has also been important work in the problem of detecting polluted packets when they are in-
jected, see for example [KFM04], [CJL06], [GR06], [GR06], [ZKMH07], [YWRG08], [BFKW09], [DCNR09],
[ABBF10], and [WVNK10]. These schemes are helpful because they prevent polluted packets from mixing
with other packets. The most common approach has been the use of a homomorphic cryptographic scheme
(such as signature) [BFKW09], [ZKMH07], [KFM04], [YWRG08], [CJL06], [AB09], and [ABBF10]. In a
peer-to-peer setting, Krohn et al. [KFM04] propose a scheme based on homomorphic hashes to detect
on the fly whether a received packet is valid. The homomorphic hashes are used to verify if the check
blocks of downloaded files are indeed a linear combinations of the original file blocks. Gkantsidis and
Rodriguez [GR06] further extend the approach of Krohn et al. to resist pollution attacks in peer-to-peer
file distribution systems that use network coding. They also mention the entropy attack, which is similar
to our diversity attack. However, they do not solve the problem of enforcing a Byzantine client to code
diversely. Their approach is to have a node download coding coefficients from neighbors and decide from
which neighbors to download the data to get the most innovative packets. However, a Byzantine client
can still not code diversely, and for example, can choose not to code over the data from a parent that he
knows would provide innovative information to his neighbors, thus reducing overall throughput.
Wan et. al [WVNK10] propose limiting pollution attacks by identifying the malicious nodes, so that
they can be isolated, and Le and Markopoulou [LM10] by identifying the precise location of Byzantine
attackers using a homomorphic MAC scheme.
Zhao et al. [ZKMH07] provides a signatures scheme for content distribution with network coding based
on linear algebra and cryptography. The source provides all nodes with an invariant vector and public key
information. With that information, all nodes can check on the fly the validity of a packet. [YWRG08]
provides homormorphic signatures schemes for preventing such Byzantine attacks, but the paper is vacuous
due to a flaw. [CJL06] and [BFKW09] also provide homomorphic signatures schemes, with a construction
based on elliptic curves. This scheme augments the packet size by only one constant of about 1024 bits.
Another recent approach to detecting polluted packets is the algebraic watchdog [KMB10, LAV10] in
which nodes sniff on packets from other nodes and try to establish if they are polluted.
However, while all these schemes only check if a packet is valid, they cannot establish if a packet is
diverse. If Byzantine nodes are prevented from sending junk packets, because there are packet validity
checks, it is still the case that there are other ways in which a Byzantine node can affect the throughput
without violating any validity checks. For example, a Byzantine node can simply not send any data, he
can forward one of the received packets (without coding), he can code with fixed coefficients, or he can
choose coefficients that minimize the network throughput. In Section 6, we show that Byzantine behavior
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of this kind does indeed significantly decrease throughput. All these behaviors are not considered (and not
prevented) by all previous work on pollution attacks.
3 Model
We present the network model and then formulate the security problem that we want to solve. In Section 5,
we explain how our model and protocols apply to a variety of problem domains.
3.1 Network Model
We consider a network where nodes perform random linear network coding [HKM+03] over some finite
field. Roughly, each packet is a pair consisting of a payload M and a coding vector C; nodes “code” by
choosing random coefficients and using them to compute linear combinations of the received packets. For
example: node N receives two packets 〈M1, C1〉 and 〈M2, C2〉; to random linear network code these packets,
N chooses two random coefficients α1 and α2 from a certain finite field and computes the resulting coded
packet as 〈α1M1 + α2M2, α1C1 + α2C2〉, where the computations are also performed in the finite field. In
Section 4.1, we provide more details about the structure of a packet.
The network is modeled as a directed graph in the natural way: each node in the network corresponds
to a vertex in the graph, and if a node N sends data to another node N′ then there is a directed edge in
the graph from the vertex (corresponding to the node) N to the vertex (corresponding to the node) N′; we
then say that N is a parent of N′ and that N′ is a child of N; similarly, if there is a directed edge from N′
to N′′, we say that N is a grandparent of N′′ and N′′ is a grandchild of N. Each node sends one packet per
time period to each of his children.
We always denote a generic node in the network by N; he has parents denoted by Pi and children
denoted by Cj . We denote by PN the set of parents of N. As discussed, the required set of N, denoted
by RN, is the subset of PN indicating which parents the node N should code over. Ideally, the required
set would be equal to the parent set, but this may not be possible in all settings or applications. (See
Section 5 where we discuss various choices of the required set.) See Figure 2 for a diagram of a network
using our notation.
...
...
...
...
...
...
S
P1
P2
P3
P4
C1
C2
D2
D1
N
C3
PN
RN
Figure 2: A source node S sends data to two destination nodes D1 and D2. A generic node
N somewhere in the graph has parent nodes P1, P2, P3, and P4 (of which P1 and P2 form
his required set RN) and has children nodes C1, C2, and C3.
Each node N has a public key pkN and a corresponding secret key skN. We assume that each node
knows the public key pkS of the source S; this is a reasonable assumption present in most previous work
on pollution attacks [BFKW09], [ZKMH07], [KFM04], [YWRG08], [CJL06], and [ABBF10]; for example,
a node may be given this public key upon entering the system.
In some settings (Section 5), we will need each node N to have a certificate certN that his public
key is valid and belongs to it; certN consists of a signature from the source or some other trusted party:
sig(pkN, “this is the public key of N”). A node need only obtain such a signature once per lifetime of the
node and it can be performed, for example, when the node joins the network.
In order for a child Cj to check that his parent coded correctly using the protocols that we present in
Section 4, Cj needs to know what is the required set RN of N and what are the public keys of the nodes
in this set. Nodes do not need to know the required set (or the set of grandparents) for their parents a
priori; in fact, dynamically adjusting the required set is important for dynamic networks. In Section 5.2,
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we explain how nodes can acquire the required set for each of their parents depending on the application.
We also explain for which applications our protocols are most fit and for which they are not fit. For now,
assume that each nodes knows precisely the nodes in the required set of each parent.
3.2 Threat Model
Nodes in the network may be Byzantine (i.e., malicious or faulty): a node can pollute the data coming
from the source by sending out a packet that is invalid or decrease the throughput by sending a packet
that is not a result of coding over packets received from each parent in the required set. In Section 6, we
discuss several Byzantine behaviors and how they affect the throughput of the network.
Even worse, Byzantine nodes can collude among each other. A node can collude with his parents,
children or any other node in the network to pass the verification tests at his honest children.
We consider the adversarial model in which Byzantine nodes will use the best adversarial strategy
to decrease the throughput at the sinks while still passing our verification tests. As already discussed,
we assume that there exist penalties in place that create enough incentives for not cheating detectably ;
a discussion of what these penalties should be (e.g., a fine, an investigation, removal from the system,
resource choking, reputation decrease, or making topology adjustments) is out of the scope of this paper
and one should choose what best fits one’s application.
3.3 Solution Approach and Goals
Similarly to prior work on pollution signatures, we also take a “verification test” solution approach. Our
technical goal is to design a protocol that provably implements such a test for correctness:
Verification test by node Cj when receiving packet P from node N. A procedure
run by child Cj upon receiving a packet P from parent N to verify that node N generated P
by coding correctly (i.e., using pseudorandom coefficients over a packet from each parent
in the required set RN of N).
If a Byzantine node N passes the verification test performed by an honest child Cj , the Byzantine node
must have coded correctly over the required data. Therefore, such a verification test would achieve the
goal of this paper, because each honest node in the network has the ability to enforce correct random
linear network coding at each of his parents.
Specifically, the verification test should satisfy the following properties:
1. A Byzantine node that does not follow the random linear coding algorithm should be detected with
overwhelming probability.
2. The test must be efficient with respect to computation and bandwidth.
3. The verification test must be collusion resistant: an honest child should be able to check if his
parent coded over all the honest nodes in his required set, regardless of whether other children or
grandparents are Byzantine or not.
4. If the verification test fails, it is possible to prove it. In particular, this implies that a node can, not
only detect, but also prove, when a parent cheats.
We require that the computational overhead that each node incurs by running the verification test is
reasonable and, moreover, we also require that the increase in packet size (due to the extra information
sent to later nodes in order to enable them to run the verification test) does not depend on the payload of
the packet. (Recall that network coding is particularly useful when the packet payload is large and the
overhead of the coefficients becomes negligible.)
The protocols we propose (and which are presented in Section 4) achieve the above four properties.
We remark that tackling collusion is challenging. For example, a node N could collude with a child
Cj : N could send a packet to Cj that is not the result of coding over all the nodes in the required set
with pseudorandom coefficients, and Cj would simply neglect running the verification test on N. Still,
we want to ensure that the other, honest children of N can verify that they do receive correctly-coded
packets. This means that each child node Cj must be able to independently check N and not rely on any
shared information that is required to stay secret. Similarly, ideally, if some parents collude with N, N’s
children should still be able to check that N coded over all the required parents that did not collude with
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N. This means that the parents cannot have some secret shared data in the protocol, all of this making
the cryptographic protocol more challenging.
Finally, while the network model that we adopt is simple, we show in Section 5 that it is expressive:
there we explain how to use this model for a variety of network settings and applications, either directly
or with simple extensions.
4 Protocol
We describe the protocols a node needs to run to perform the verification test on each of his parents and
to assemble packets to send to his children. For clarity, we present the protocols in an incremental fashion,
by successively adding more security properties. But first we will need to introduce some basic notation
and cryptographic tools that we use.
4.1 Notation
A sequence (or tuple) of n components x1, . . . , xn is denoted by (x1, . . . , xn) or (xi)
n
i=1; for simplicity, some-
times we omit the starting and ending indices of the sequence, thus only writing (xi)i. The concatenation
of two strings a and b is denoted by a||b.
We denote by |RN| the number of (parent) nodes in the required set RN of node N; by pkN and skN
the public and secret keys of node N; and by sigN (x) a signature of a message x with respect to the
key pair (pkN, skN) of N, where the underlying signature scheme is assumed to satisfy the usual notion of
unforgeability (i.e., existential unforgeability under chosen-message attack). For concreteness, we use the
DSA algorithm [NIS], whose signatures are only 320 bits long.
Let q be the prime number used in any of the pollution signature schemes in [BFKW09], [ZKMH07],
[KFM04], [YWRG08], [CJL06], and [ABBF10]. For example, in [BFKW09], q is a 160-bit prime.
In network coding, as already mentioned, a packet has the form E = 〈M,C〉, whereM is the payload and
C the coding vector. (In our protocols, we will augment the packet with additional tokens.) The payload
M is an n-tuple (m1, . . . ,mn) of chunks, where each chunk mi is an element of Z∗q , the multiplicative group
of integers modulo the prime q. A coding vector C is an m-tuple (c1, . . . , cm) of chunks, where each chunk
is also an element of Z∗q . Hence, E consists of n + m chunks e1, . . . , en+m, where ei = mi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and ei = ci−n for n < i ≤ n+m. In particular, we can think of M , C, and E as vectors in some product
space of Z∗q .
4.2 Cryptographic tools
We now briefly review the cryptographic tools that we employ in our protocols:
Pseudorandom functions. Informally, a pseudorandom function family is a family of polynomial-
time computable functions {Fs : {0, 1}|s| → {0, 1}|s|}s∈{0,1}∗ with the property that, for a sufficiently
large security parameter k and a random k-bit seed s, Fs “looks like” a random function to any efficient
procedure. See [GGM86] for more details.
Merkle hashes. A Merkle hash [Mer89] is a concise commitment to n elements. Suppose that Alice has
n elements and she gives Bob a Merkle hash of them. Later, when Bob asks to see some elements from
Alice, the Merkle hash allows Bob to check that indeed the elements Alice gives him are the same elements
over which she had computed the Merkle hash. Loosely, to compute the Merkle hash of n elements, Alice
places the elements at the leaves of a full binary tree; she recursively computes each node higher in the
tree as the hash of the concatenation of the two children. The resulting hash at the root is called the
Merkle hash/commitment of the n elements. Given n elements and their Merkle hash, Alice can reveal an
element, say element i, to Bob by revealing the label of every node (and his sibling) along the path from
the leaf node containing element i to the root; Bob verifies the correctness of element i by re-hashing the
elements bottom-up and then verifying that the resulting hash is equal to the claimed Merkle hash. The
advantage of the Merkle hash is that Bob only needs to ask O(log n) elements from Alice to check that a
element out of n has been correctly included in the Merkle hash. See [Mer89] for more details.
Pollution signatures. A pollution signature scheme (such as [BFKW09], [ZKMH07], [KFM04], [YWRG08],
[CJL06], and [ABBF10]) is a signature scheme consisting of the usual triplet of algorithms (gen, sig, ver)
with a special homomorphic property that allows it to be used to detect pollution attacks in network
coding.
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Specifically, the source S runs the key generation algorithm gen to produce a secret key skS, together
with a corresponding public key pkS that is published for everyone to use. The source S augments each
outgoing packet E with a special signature σS(E), generated by running the algorithm sig on input the
secret key skS and the packet E; we refer to this special signature as a validity signature of the packet E
with respect to the public key pkS.
When a node receives a (signed) packet 〈E, σS(E)〉, he verifies the signature on the packet, by running
the algorithm ver on input the public key pkS, the packet E, and the signature σS(E).
Pollution signature schemes have the useful homomorphic property that, when given several packets
together with their validity signatures, any node is able to compute a validity signature of any linear
combination of those packets, without communicating with the source S. For example, if a node N re-
ceives two (signed) packets 〈E1, σS(E1)〉 and 〈E2, σS(E2)〉, then, for any two coefficients α and β, N can
compute a validity signature of the packet E = αE1 + βE2; in some schemes, this is done by computing
σS(αE1 + βE2) = σS(E1)
α · σS(E2)β , where each of these computations are performed in a certain field
and the equality holds due to homorphism. See [BFKW09], [ZKMH07], [KFM04], [YWRG08], [CJL06],
and [ABBF10] for more details.
4.3 A Generic Protocol
In order to avoid repetition in the presentation of our protocols, in this section we introduce the general
structure that will be followed by each protocol version that we present; later, in any given protocol version,
we will replace any unspecified quantities or procedures with concrete values or algorithms.
First we discuss the new packet structure: every packet E transmitted by a generic node N is augmented
with three cryptographic tokens; the first token has already been used in prior work, while the last two
tokens are new to our protocols:
1. A validity signature σS(E), which is used to prevent pollution attacks. Any (secure) pollution
signature scheme [BFKW09], [ZKMH07], [KFM04], [YWRG08], [CJL06], and [ABBF10] may be
used to produce this signature (as we rely only on the guarantees it provides and not on details of
its implementation).
2. A test token TN, which is used by each child Cj of N to run the verification test on N, denoted
VerifTest.
3. A helper token HN, which is used by each child Cj of N to produce his own test token TCj , using a
procedure called Combine.
Specifically, the protocol that a generic node N runs, after receiving packets from his parents, in order to
produce a packet for each of his children, takes the general form of Algorithm 1, where the procedures
VerifTest, CheckHelper, and Combine, as well as the value of HN, will be specified later:
Algorithm 1 Protocol at a generic node N
1: From each parent node Pi ∈ PN, node N receives a packet 〈EPi , σS(EPi), TPi , HPi〉.
2: For each parent node Pi ∈ PN, node N verifies that σS(EPi) is a valid signature of EPi using the public
key pkS of the source S, verifies that VerifTest (EPi , σS(EPi), TPi) accepts, and that HPi is correct
using CheckHelper(EPi , σS(EPi), HPi) .
3: Node N computes EN by coding over all EPi and σS(EN), as described at the end of Section 4.2.
4: Node N computes TN = Combine
(
(EPi , σS(EPi), HPi)Pi∈PN
)
and HN.
5: Node N assembles the packet 〈EN, σS(EN), TN, HN〉, and sends it to each child Cj .
In Step 2, for each parent Pi from which N receives a packet: N checks the validity signature of the
packet to establish whether Pi sent polluted data or not; then, N checks the test token TPi by running the
verification test to establish that Pi coded correctly; next, N needs to make sure Pi sent a correct helper
token (without which N could not compute a good test token TN himself and would fail the verification
test at his children).
If any of the checks above fail, N will report them and act in some way that is application-specific. As
we will see in Section 4.7, N can accompany his complaint with a proof that his parent cheated.
In our protocol, each node verifies his parents (if he is not the source) and is being verified by his
children (if he is not a sink/destination). Thus, N verifiers Pi, and Cj verifies N.
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4.4 How to Force Byzantine Nodes to Code Over All Required Packets
As a first step, we design a verification test that enables any child Cj of a node N to check that N did
indeed code over all of the parent nodes in his required set RN, i.e., that the packet sent by N to Cj is a
linear combination of packets from parents in the required set with coefficients all of which are not equal
to zero.
A na¨ıve solution. The node N can simply forward to each of his children all the packets received from
parents in the required set. Of course, N’s parents make sure to sign (using their own secret keys) the
packets they send to N, so that Cj can be sure that the packets forwarded by N are indeed from N’s parents.
In other words, N forwards to each child Cj the following data: EPi , σS(EPi), and sigPi(EPi ||σS(EPi)), the
coding coefficients used for the packets from each parent, and the newly coded payload EN with the new
integrity signature σS(EN). Each child Cj can then establish whether N coded correctly, because he now
has access to all the information N received from his parents and can thus check that N did not use any
zero coefficients.
Clearly, this solution is bandwidth inefficient: the payload of the packet can be very large and N will
send |RN|+ 1 such payloads to his children, reducing throughput |RN|+ 1 times.
Payload-Independent Protocol (PIP). We now improve on the na¨ıve solution, by avoiding to in-
clude the packet payload in the test token sent for verification, thus saving considerable bandwidth and
throughput.
Each parent Pi sends a helper token consisting of a parent signature on the validity signature:
HPi := sigPi
(
σS(EPi) || “from Pi to N”
)
.
The text in HPi prevents a colluding N from giving this helper token to some other node N
′, which could
otherwise falsely claim that he received the data from Pi.
The test token TN of node N is computed by a simple concatenation; specifically, Combine computes
the following test token:
TN =
((
αi, σS(EPi), HPi
))
Pi∈PN
,
where αi is the coding coefficient that N used for the packet from Pi.
The verification test for this version of the protocol is given in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 VerifTest of node N, by child Cj
1: for each parent Pi ∈ PN do
2: Cj checks that TN contains an entry
(
ci, σS(EPi), HPi
)
for the current parent Pi.
3: Cj checks that HPi verifies with pkPi as a signature of σS(EPi).
4: Cj checks that αi 6= 0.
5: end for
6: Cj verifies that combining all validity signatures σS(EPi) and coefficients αi results in σS(EN), according
to the homomorphic property discussed in Section 4.2.
Step 2 verifies that N provided test data for parent Pi. Step 3 checks that the data is authentic. Step
4 establishes that the coefficient used in coding over this parent is nonzero. Step 6 checks that the coded
data from N indeed corresponds to coded data over the information from the parents with the claimed
coefficients αi.
We now give some intuition for why Algorithm 2 is a good verification test, leaving a formal proof to
Section 4.8. If N does not code over the packet of some parent, say from parent P1, in order for N to
produce a validity signature σS(EN) for EN that verifies successfully under the public key pkS, N needs
to combine only those validity signatures from parents he coded over and not include σS(EP1) in the
computation; at Step 6, however, Cj uses the validity signature from all required parents to check σS(EN)
(with a coefficient αi that was checked to be nonzero in Step 4) and the check would fail.
CheckHelper at Cj consists of checking that HN is indeed a signature on EN and is not a signature
on zero.
The length of the test token TN is now
|TN| = |RN| ·
(|σS|+ |sig|) ,
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AP1 = σS(EP1)||HP1 ||αP1
AP2 = σS(EP2)||HP2 ||αP2
...
B1 =
〈
h(AP1),σS(αP1EP1)
〉
B2 =
〈
h(AP2),σS(αP2EP2)
〉
B1,2 =
〈
h(B1||B2),σS(αP1EP1 + αP2EP2)
〉
B1,2,3,4 =
〈
h(B1,2||B3,4),σS(αP1EP1 + αP2EP2 + αP3EP3 + αP4EP4)
〉
...
...
...
B1,...,|RN| =
〈
TN,σS(EN)
〉
Figure 3: Diagram representing the computation of the helper token TN: for each parent
Pi, define APi = σS(EPi)||HPi ||αPi ; then recursively apply the hash function h as indicated,
and recursively compute pollution signatures with the indicated coefficients.
where |σS| denotes the size of the pollution signature and |sig| the size of the signature scheme introduced
in Section 4.1. Indeed, the length of TN does not depend on the payload any more. Also, recall that the
lengths of the signatures are constant. Note, though, that |TN| is linear in the number of parents; this may
not be a problem, but in applications where the payload is not that large or where there can be many
parents, it would be desirable to have a smaller token. Moreover, verifying |RN| digital signatures in the
verification test (Step 3 above) will become expensive if the number of parents is not small.
Logarithmic Payload-Independent Protocol (Log-PIP). We provide a second protocol in which
the length of the helper token TN is significantly shorter:
|TN| = |h|+ |σS|+ |sig|+ 2 · |σS| · log(|RN|) ,
where |h| is the size of a hash (e.g. 160 bits for SHA-1), thus replacing |RN| with the much smaller value
log(|RN|) (where the logarithm is base 2). The second protocol that we present, however, is probabilistic in
its guarantees: rather than enabling a child Cj to test if a parent N cheated (with overwhelming confidence),
we enable Cj to detect misbehavior of N with a certain (adjustable) probability.
Specifically, after receiving the packet from N, node Cj picks a required parent of N at random and
challenges N to prove that he coded correctly over that parent. Of course, N does not know ahead of
time on what packets he will be challenged. As shown in Section 6, such probabilistic approach is still
quite effective because the chance that a Byzantine node N is detected cheating grows exponentially in the
number of times he attempts to cheat. In Section 6, we provide recommendations for when we believe it
is more appropriate to use PIP or Log-PIP.
The basic idea of Log-PIP is that N will send to Cj a test token TN that is the root of a Merkle hash tree
constructed over the data of the test token used in PIP; namely, a Merkle hash tree where the elements at
the leaves are the tuples
(
αi, σS(EPi), sigPi
(
σS(EPi) || “from Pi to N”
))
ranging over the parents Pi. Each
Cj will then challenge N by asking to see a certain path in the Merkle hash tree corresponding to a parent
of N. In this way, Cj can check if N coded over that parent (i.e., N used a non-zero coefficient). Of course,
N cannot provide arbitrary data to Cj when replying the challenge of Cj , as guaranteed by the security
properties of a Merkle hash. Therefore, if N did not code over a parent, Cj will discover this with a known
probability.
Let h be a hashing scheme. Figure 3 illustrates the Merkle tree that N has to compute and provides
notation for our discussion. We slightly modify the traditional Merkle hash, by adding data at internal
nodes and changing the recursion. Each leaf node APi in the Merkle tree consists of a “summary” of the
data from a required parent Pi of N. Each internal node consists of the validity signature obtained by coding
over all the packets at the leaves of the subtree rooted by the internal node and a hash of the two children.
The root node will thus contain the test token TN as the root hash and the validity signature over EN,
namely σS(EN). Thus, Combine consists of computing the Merkle hash to obtain the Merkle hash root, so
that TN = “Merkle hash root”. HPi is the same as in PIP, that is, HPi = sigPi
(
σS(EPi) || “from Pi to N”
)
.
The verification test VerifTest is ran in a different way than in PIP. Each node Cj receives the
packet from N, checks the validity signature, and he can proceed to code and forward the packet. It
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can then challenge node N to check if N indeed coded over all the packets. During a challenge, only
log |RN| source signatures and hashes will be retrieved, due to the Merkle tree property. Moreover, only
one digital signature will be verified, the one corresponding to the parent from the challenge. For the
Merkle recursion, only hash verifications and homomorphic signature operations (which typically consist
of multiplying 1024-bit numbers) will be performed, so the overall cost is dominated by a single digital
signature verification.
The number of challenges is selected based on the desired probability of detection. With t challenges,
there is a probability of t/|RN| of detecting that N did not code over a parent. After r transmissions in
which N cheats, the probability of detecting N is at least 1 − (1 − t/d)r (this is achieved when N cheats
minimally – by not coding over one parent), which increases exponentially in r. Coupled with penalties,
such a probabilistic approach offers incentives against cheating.
Node N needs to remember the values that constituted the Merkle tree until the children finished
challenging it. One challenge checks that the node coded correctly over a parent; multiple challenges can
be sent at once and processed together.
Algorithm 3 Challenge on node N by node Cj
1: Cj picks a parent Pi of N at random and informs N of the choice.
2: N must present APi (defined in Figure 3) and all values of the nodes in the Merkle tree that are siblings
to nodes on the path from APi to the root and their siblings.
3: Cj runs VerifTest:
i verifies that HPi is a correct signature over σs(EPi) using pkPi and that αi 6= 0
ii verifies that the validity signature in APi combined with αi is the same as the validity signature
in Bi,
iii the validity signature at each internal node is a multiplication of the validity signatures at the
children of the node,
iv recomputes the Merkle hash based on the hashes provided by N and checks equality to TN,
v checks that the validity signature, provided when N initially transmitted, verifies the validity
signature at the top of the Merkle tree,
vi checks HN to be a signature using pkN on σS(EN).
As for CheckHelper, Cj still needs to check that HN is indeed a signature on EN and is not a signature
on zero to prevent N from causing Cj to fail the verification test at Cj ’s children. Proofs of security for
this protocol are included in Section 4.8.
Collusion. Both PIP and Log-PIP are collusion resistant: even if a child colludes with N, the other
children check N independently. Moreover, if N colludes with a parent P1, N still needs to code correctly
over the rest of the parents that he did not collude with because he cannot forge these parents signatures
if N has at least one honest child verifying it.
4.5 How to Force Byzantine Nodes to Code Pseudorandomly
As a second step, we design a verification test that enables any child Cj of a node N to check, not only
whether a packet received from N is valid and derived using non-zero coefficients over each parent in his
required set (as was guaranteed by the solution presented in Section 4.4), but also whether the node N
coded using (pseudo)random coefficients in Z∗q .
The basic idea is to require node N to generate the pseudorandom coefficients from a seed that is also
known to each child Cj , so that each Cj will be able to generate these same coefficients and use them as
part of his verification test on N.
We assume that each client knows a random seed s that is public; a trusted party drew the seed at
random when the system started. For example, a client can learn about the seed s when he joins the
system. In a wireless setting with no membership, a node can either have s already hardcoded, or he
can obtain it from his neighbors (s can be accompanied by a signature from a trusted party to make sure
that malicious neighbors cannot lie about its value). The seed can remain the same for the lifetime of the
system.
Using the seed s, the coefficients can then be generated using a pseudorandom function Fs (defined in
Section 4.2). For each parent Pi in the parent set PN, the node N computes α∗i = Fs(Pi||N) (of course,
mapped to the field of the coefficients) and uses α∗i as the coding coefficient for the packet from Pi.
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Observe that, contrary to what the definition of the pseudorandomness property [GGM86] prescribes,
the seed s is not kept private, but is instead made public. Of course, in such a case, one cannot expect that
the input-output relation induced by Fs is unpredictable; indeed, it is deterministic, because now Fs may
be computed by anyone (and is not an “oracle” anymore). Nonetheless, since in our setting the inputs
to Fs are not under the control of Byzantine nodes, and are predetermined, it is easy to show that the
outputs of Fs on these inputs will still retain the statistical properties that we are interested in, allowing
for the network throughput to still be maximal using these “pseudorandom” coefficients.
If one wishes to enable N to use a different set of coding coefficients for each child Cj , the computation
of the coding coefficients can be changed to α∗i,j = Fs(Pi||N||Cj); thus N must use α∗i,j to code over the data
from Pi when preparing a packet for child Cj . Intuitively, using different coefficients increases throughput
in some topologies because of more diversity; this can be helpful in P2P networks, for example, but not
so much in a wireless setting where transmitting different data to children will not take advantage of the
shared medium on which multiple children can listen.
The verification tests in previous sections can now be easily modified to have each child Cj check that
N coded over each parent in the required set with this exact coding coefficients α∗i (or α
∗
i,j): in Step 4 of
Algorithm 2 and in Step 3i of Algorithm 3, node Cj must check that αi equals α
∗
i (or α
∗
i,j). With this
check in place, Byzantine nodes are forced to code with pseudorandom coefficients. Section 4.8 shows that
Byzantine nodes cannot code with different coefficients and pass the verification test.
4.6 How to Prevent Replay Attacks of Old Data
One problem is that a Byzantine client may code correctly for one transmission, but may attempt to
cheat on the next transmission by sending the old data he sent for the first transmission. In some cases,
such a strategy reduces throughput, but in others, it even pollutes packets downstream in the network.
Nevertheless, the Byzantine client will pass any pollution test because the source uses the same keys for
signing in both transmissions; the node will also pass our diversity tests above because he coded correctly
over his parents in the first transmission.
Therefore, we need to prevent such replay attacks. In fact, the problem of replay attacks belongs to
the use of pollution schemes and is not introduced by our diversity enforcement scheme. Any solution for
that setting will suffice in our setting as well because of the way we build “on top” of validity signatures.
Therefore, any overhead introduced by such a scheme already is introduced by the use of pollution schemes
and does not come with diversity enforcement.
We propose one such replay solution. The idea is to have the source change the validity signature key
with every transmission so that any attempt by a Byzantine client to use old data would be detected when
checking the validity signature. Let (skS,k, pkS,k) denote the public key used by the source in the k-th
transmission. The source has one master signing key pair of which the public verification key is known
to all users as before. To inform nodes of the public key used during a transmission, the source will send
with every packet this public key accompanied by a signature of this public key using the master signing
key. The source signs the public key to prevent malicious clients from forging public keys of their own and
claiming they belong to the source.
For our diversity scheme, we make use of the public key corresponding to each transmission to add diver-
sity in the coding coefficients across transmissions. Each node should now code with α∗i = Fs(Pi||N||pkS,k)
and their children will check the inclusion of pkS,k in the coding coefficients along with the other tests they
perform; without pkS,k, the coding coefficients will be the same across different transmissions.
4.7 How to Enable Nodes to Prove Misbehavior
We discuss how any child Cj of a node N can prove N’s misbehavior to a third party, when the verification
test for N fails. Recall that the ability to convince a third party (such as the source, a membership service,
or other authoritative agents in the system) that N did indeed misbehave is important to allow for punitive
measures to be enacted. Furthermore, the ability to prove misbehavior reinforces the deterrent effect of
verification tests.
We use signatures in a natural way to provide such proofs: Step 5 of Algorithm 1 is modified so that
a node N attaches an additional “attest” token to the packet he sends to his children; the attest token
consists of a signature of the whole packet under his own secret key skN. Each child Cj of N will then
verify this signature (and ignore any data from N that does not carry a valid “attest” signature).
If a child Cj establishes that his parent N did not code correctly based on the verification tests in
Algorithm 2 or Algorithm 3, he can provide the packet from N together with his attest token as proof to a
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third party. Any other party knowing the required set RN of node N can run the VerifTest procedures
to establish if N cheated. Of course, by the unforgeability property of the signature scheme, children of N
cannot falsely accuse N of misbehavior.
4.8 Proofs of Security
Theorem 4.1 (Security of PIP). In protocol PIP, if a generic node N passes all checks at an honest
child Cj , it means that N coded over the value from P1, EP1 , with precisely coefficient c1 (as described in
Section 4.5), where P1 is any generic parent from N’s required set.
Proof. Algorithm 2 gives VerifTest for the PIP protocol. If N passes the checks in Step 2, it means that
N provided the triple
(
c1, σ(EP1), HP1
)
in TN; if N passes the checks in tep 3 and Step 4, it means that P1
indeed provided σ(EP1) and c1 6= 0; if N passes the check in Step 6, it means that N computed σ(EN) by
including σ(EP1) with coefficient c1 in the homomorphic computation (described in Section 4.2).
In Step 2 of Algorithm 1 when run by Cj , the node Cj checks that σ(EN) verifies as a signature of
N. By the theorem’s hypothesis, the pollution signature verifies, so that, by the security of the pollution
scheme (detailed in [BFKW09]), it must be the case that N included c1 · EP1 when computing EN.
Theorem 4.2 (Security of Log-PIP). In protocol Log-PIP, if a generic node N did not code over any
given parent, say P1, from his required set with coefficient c1 (as described in Section 4.5), and an honest
child Cj challenges N on t random parents, the probability that N is detected (some check fails) is at least
t/|RN|.
Proof. The strategy of the proof is to present some exhaustive cases in which N could not have coded
over a parent, and show that in each such case the probability of detection is ≥ t/|RN|. Consider the
tree TreeN of values that N used when he computed the Merkle hash that he gave to Cj . Because of the
Merkle hash guarantees, N cannot come up with any other tree (that is not a subtree of TreeN), that
has the same Merkle root hash. If any leaf i in this tree (if a leaf exists) does not satisfy check (i) in
Step 3 of Algorithm 3, it will be caught if Cj challenges N on parent Pi, which happens with probability
t/|RN|. Similarly, if any internal nodes Bi do not satisfy check (ii), Cj will detect this with probability at
least t/|RN|. Therefore, we can assume that the first level of internal nodes in the TreeN consists of the
expected hashes and σ(ciEPi) where ci is the desired coefficient and σ(EPi) is indeed the validity signature
from parent Pi. If any internal node in TreeN does not satisfy check (iii), this will be detected whenever
N is challenged on a value i that involves a path through the Merkle tree passing through the broken
internal node; this happens with probability at least t/|RN|. Therefore, assuming all internal nodes pass
check (iii), it means that the validity signature at the top of the tree must be σ(
∑
i ciEPi). If the validity
signature at the top of TreeN does not match the one initially provided by N (i.e., σ(EN)), check (v) will fail
with probability 1. Assuming, this check succeeds it must be the case that the validity signature initially
provided by N is a proper validity signature after coding with ci over all Pi. Since the validity signature
matched EN (check (2) of Algorithm 1 when run at child Cj), it means that N coded over all parents with
the right coefficients, by the guarantees of the validity signature. Therefore, there are no more cases of
possible cheating from N to consider and since all previous types of cheating were caught with chance
≥ t/|RN|, the proof is complete.
5 Applications and Extensions
In this section, we describe applications and extensions of our protocol.
5.1 Types of Required Sets
In our protocols so far, we considered that a child of node N performs the verification test on a specific
set of required parents for N. However, one can use different types of verification tests, some being more
useful for certain settings, as we will see. All these verifications, in fact, just map to verifying a specific
required set as before.
A child Cj can perform any of the following checks for node N:
(1) N coded over all his parents or over a specific set of parents.
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(2) Threshold enforcement: N coded over at least d parents. This check can be enforced by having N send an
indication of which parents he coded over with their public keys and certificates (defined in Section 3.2):
Cj checks that these are at least d in number, checks the certificate of each public key to make sure N
did not falsify these keys, and that N indeed coded over them.
(3) N coded over at least some subset of parents. This is a combination of Item 1 and Item 2. Cj checks
that N coded over the subset of parents as in Item 1 and over some valid parents as in Item 2.
(4) N coded over a set of parents with some application-level property. For example, N must code over at
least two parents noted by some application as high priority and at least five parents in total. The
priority of each node Pi can be included in the certificate certPi . N again indicates the nodes he coded
over to Cj along with their public keys and certificates, and Cj checks that at least two certificates
contains high priority and there are at least five in total. Other general application semantics can be
supported by this verification case.
5.2 Applications and Required Sets
In this section, we describe the various settings to which our protocols are applicable, and how the nodes
would learn of the required set of their parents.
Our model applies to settings in which a node can learn the required set of his parents, such as:
1) Systems with a membership service: the membership service can inform a node of his grandparents when
the node joins and when changes occur. Some peer-to-peer and content distribution systems fall in this
category.
2) Systems having a reliable yet potentially low capacity channel besides the channel where the coding
occurs (which may be less reliable, but has higher capacity): the reliable channel can be used to commu-
nicate topology changes between nodes. Some examples of applications are decentralized peer-to-peer
applications and content distribution, as well as some wireless networks.
3) Static topologies: these topologies do not change or change rarely. The topology is mostly known to the
nodes (e.g., nodes can discover it when joining), so a node will know his grandparents. Wired as well
as some wireless network applications fall in this category. For wired networks, since the topology is
more static and delays tend to be lower, more aggressive verification tests can be implemented (e.g. the
required set is most of the parents or all of the parents, depending on the particular system).
4) Moderately dynamic wireless topologies: the set of grandparents for a node may change many times, after
each change, it remains the same for enough time allowing the node to discover the new grandparents.
Let us discuss how a child can learn about his changing grandparents in dynamic topologies. First of all,
for such topologies, we recommend nodes use the threshold enforcement scheme (described in (Item 2
above) because the set of parents of a node changes dynamically. The threshold should be adjusted
based on some minimum number of links a node is expected to have in order to code diversely.
Consider that parents of node N have changed and child Cj wants to learn about this. We use the same
links used by packet flow to inform Cj of his grandparents. Each new parent Pi sends N: his public key
and the corresponding certificate certPi . N sends this information to Ci. Let’s discuss the case when
N is malicious and may try to inform Ci of incorrect parent list. Note that N cannot lie that Pi is a
parent when he is not because, if N does not have a link to Pi, during transmission time, nodes Ci will
verify that N coded over the data from Pi which N could not have done because he did not receive this
data. Moreover, N cannot create some public keys of his own and claim that some parents with those
public keys exist, because each node key has a certification as discussed. On the other hand, N may
try to simply not report any of his parents so that he does not have to forward or code over any data.
However, each child Ci will expect N to report at least a threshold of parents; if N does not do so, Ci
can be suspicious and denounce N of potentially being malicious, as discussed in Section 3.2. Therefore,
N can choose which d parents to code over from the set of parents physically linked to it, but he cannot
choose less than d such parents.
However, our scheme would not work well for highly changing topologies that also do not fall under
any of Item 1 or Item 2. Such an example are military ad-hoc wireless networks where the nodes are in
constant rapid movement; this would not allow a child to discover his grandparents effectively.
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5.3 Extensions
In this section, we describe how our protocol could be applied to other network coding scenarios.
First, note that we did not make any assumption about what a link or a node really is. A link can be
a physical link, a chain of physical links, or even a subnetwork. For example, in a peer to peer network,
a link can include an entire subnetwork via which some peers send data to a receiving peer. In this case,
our protocol can be used to check that the receiving peer coded over all sender peers when he forwards the
packets to some other peer. As another example, a link in a wired network may represent a connection,
while a link in a wireless network may be the ability to hear/communicate with another node or be an
edge induced by the data transmission graph. Moreover, a node can be a physical node (a router, a peer
in a P2P network) or a subnetwork; in fact, a few nodes in our model can form one node for a certain
system. Using these observations, we can express constraints of real-world networks:
Multiple packets may be sent on some links. Consider that parent Pi has a capacity of p packets
on the link to node N. In this case, in our protocol, Pi will be represented as p different nodes, each with
a different public key. With this transformation, our protocol can be used unchanged.
Broadcast links. Broadcast in wireless can be mapped to our model by having the parent have one link
(the same link) to all his children (basically, viewing all children as one child), and our protocols can be
applied unchanged.
Multi-source network coding. In the multi-source network coding case, intermediate nodes combine
packets for different files from different sources, but each source operates independently and may not
communicate with the others. In such work, the metadata of the packet is augmented with information
about which source and which file identifiers the current packet contains.
To support our protocols in the multi-source case, note that PIP and Log-PIP depend on source
information only when checking validity signatures. Moreover, our protocols are built modularly on top of
a validity signature and do not depend on any particular scheme. This means that all we need is a multi-
source validity signature and the rest of the algorithms will remain unchanged. Recent work [ABBF10]
proposes such schemes: sources can send packets independently of each other, each packet contains a
validity signature, and these signatures can be checked at each intermediate node by knowing the public
keys of each of these sources. Children will be able to check if their parents coded over the appropriate
grandparents as before.
Asynchronous networks and delay intolerant networks. A child may receive data from his parents
at different times. For efficiency reasons, the child may have to code over the data that he received already
and send the data forward, and not wait until a piece arrived from every parent. In this case, the child N
can enforce the threshold verification above, thus checking that the packet from N is coded over at least a
few parents.
Various levels of abstraction. Our protocol can be used at various levels of abstraction. For example,
in peer-to-peer networks, nodes can perform:
• End-to-end check. A peer can check that the data from another peer is the result of coding over
the data of all of certain sources, even if those sources communicated with the tested peer via other
nodes or networks.
• Individual node check. A peer can check that the data from another peer is the result of coding over
all of certain peers to which this peer should be connected to according to the Peer-to-Peer algorithm
they run or whatever application they run.
A lot of P2P systems are taking advantage of smartphones nowadays. In Section 6, we show that our
protocol is efficient even when run on a smart phone such as Android Nexus One.
6 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the usefulness and the performance of our protocol.
6.1 Simulation
We run a Python simulation to show that there is significant throughput loss due to Byzantine behavior not
detected in previous work, but detected in our protocols. We examined three types of node behavior: (Mode
1) Byzantine nodes choose coding coefficients such that their packet does not provide new information at
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Figure 4: (a) One and (b) ten Byzantine nodes on the mincut.
their children; (Mode 2) Byzantine nodes simply forward one of the received packets (and do not code);
(Mode 3) Byzantine nodes are forced to code with pseudorandom coefficients. We can see that neither
Mode 1 nor Mode 2 are detected by prior work on pollution schemes, but both are detected by our
protocols. Mode 3, which is the correct behavior, is enforced only by our protocols.
The simulation constructs a graph by assigning edges at random between nodes, but maintaining the
given minimum cut. The Byzantine nodes are placed on the minimum cut. We ran the simulation for [50
nodes, 1000 edges, 5 packets sent from the source, min-cut up to 10, 1 Byzantine node] and [100 nodes,
2000 edges, 20 packets send from the source, min-cut value up to 20, 10 Byzantine nodes]. Figure 4 shows
the throughput (i.e., the degrees of freedom) at the sink plotted against the min-cut value. We can see
that the throughput difference between Modes 1/2 and Mode 3 is significant. Moreover, when the min-cut
value of the network is small (e.g., 5), the throughput increase when using Mode 3 can be as large as
twice (see min-cut value of 3 in Figure 4(a)). In Figure 4 (b), we can see a more significant throughput
difference. Mode 3 has a throughput of about 10 degrees of freedom more than Mode 1 (which is 50% of
the data sent by the source) and about 5 degrees of freedom more than Mode 2 (which is 25% of the data
sent by the source).
6.2 Implementation
We implemented our protocol as a library (called SecureNetCode) in C/C++ and Java, as well as embedded
it into the Android platform. The C/C++ implementation is useful for lower level code that is meant to
be fast: network routers, various wireless settings, and other C/C++ programs. The Java implementation
is useful for higher-level programs such as P2P applications. We embedded the Java implementation in the
Android platform and ran it on a Nexus One smartphone. The reason is that, with the growing popularity
of smartphones, more P2P content distribution applications for smartphones are developed, some using
network coding ([Har11], [Fit08]).
Our library implementation is available at www.mit.edu/~ralucap/netcode.html . It consists of the
functions in protocols PIP and Log-PIP. Our library in C/C++ consists of 290 lines and the one in
Java consists of 274 lines including comments and white lines, but excluding standard, number theory or
cryptographic libraries. To implement certain cryptographic operations on large numbers, we used NTL
in C/C++ and BigInteger in Java. As cryptographic algorithms, we used OpenSSL DSA and SHA. The
size of the validity signature used is 1024-bit.
Results. Except for the Android results which were run on a standard Nexus One smartphone, the rest
of the results were run on a dual-core processor with 2.0 GHz and 1 GByte of RAM. There was observable
variability in the results (especially for Nexus One), so we ran the experiments up to 100 times to find an
average time.
Note that we only evaluate the performance of our diversity scheme and do not evaluate the performance
of any pollution signature protocol. The reason is that our protocol is not tied to any particular such
scheme and uses it modularly. To enforce that nodes code with coefficients of one (Section 4.4), the most
important step for throughput, we invoke the pollution scheme no more than it is invoked without our
diversity checks. To enforce our full protocol with pseudorandom coefficients, during verification, each
node computes one additional homomorphic operation of the integrity signature (per parent for PIP and
per challenge for Log-PIP), typically an exponentiation in a certain group: sigS(EPi)
α∗i . Fortunately, the
coding coefficients are typically relatively small, e.g., 64 bits (even though the integrity signature allows
them to be as large as q as explained in Section 4.1). Note that the pollution signature verification, which
is expensive, is not called additionally.
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C/C++ Java Android
PIP Log-PIP PIP Log-PIP PIP Log-PIP
1 0.2/0.3 0.3/0.2 2.3/4.5 2.7/4.5 4.7/4.2 4.9/6.9
2 0.2/0.6 0.3/0.2 2.3/9 2.7/4.6 4.7/7.6 5.1/7.1
3 0.2/0.8 0.3/0.3 2.3/14 2.8/4.6 4.7/15.4 5.7/10.4
5 0.2/1.4 0.3/0.3 2.3/23 2.8/4.7 4.7/24.4 6.7/10.5
7 0.2/1.9 0.3/0.3 2.3/32 2.9/4.7 4.7/35.4 10.2/10.8
10 0.2/2.8 0.3/0.4 2.3/45 2.9/4.7 4.6/70.6 11.9/10.3
15 0.2/4.2 0.3/0.4 2.3/68 3.0/4.7 4.6/101 11.7/10.4
50 0.3/14 0.4/0.4 2.3/224 3.4/ 4.7 4.6/351 28.5/15.6
+ 0.95|R| 0.95 8.8|R| 8.8 15.4|R| 15.4
Table 1: Performance results of PIP and Log-PIP in milliseconds. The first 8 rows with values show results for PIP and
Log-PIP when all coding coefficients are one (Section 4.4). The first column indicates the number of parents of a node. Each
data cell in the rest of the columns consists of two values: transmission time and verification time. The last row shows the
additional cost (only for verification) when adding pseudorandom coefficients (Section 4.5) due to the homomorphic operation
of the validity signature.
In Table 1, we present performance results of PIP and Log-PIP using one challenge. We consider an
integrity signature of size 1024 bits and coding coefficients of size 64 bits.
We can see that, for verification, as we increase the number of parents, the overhead of Log-PIP increases
very slowly (logarithmically) as compared to the linear performance of PIP. The same happens to packet
size, which we evaluate later in this section. Therefore, we recommend using Log-PIP for scenarios with
more than three parents, and PIP for cases with at most three parents. Alternatively, one could select
a hybrid algorithm by performing r > 1 challenges from Log-PIP. The performance of Log-PIP grows
linearly in the number of challenges so one can tune the probability of detection (see Section 4) based on
the desired tradeoff with performance overhead.
We can see that the C/C++ protocols impose modest overhead. For 10 parents, which is a reasonably
large value, the running time at a node to prepare for transmitting the data is ≈ 0.25 ms and the time
to verify a packet’s diversity 1.4 ms in total for Log-PIP; for three parents, the time to verify diversity
is 3.7 ms for PIP. All these values are independent of how large the packet payload is. Let’s compare this
to the cost of a pollution scheme, for example [BFKW09]. In this scheme, the verification consists of two
bilinear map computations and m+ n modular exponentiations, resulting in at least 100 ms run time for
verification in C using the PBC library for bilinear maps for each parent. For three parents, the relative
overhead of PIP is thus < 2% and of Log-PIP is < 0.5%. Due to this low additional overhead, we believe
that if one is already using a pollution scheme, one might as well also use our scheme in addition to provide
diversity.
The Java and Android implementations are slower because of the language and/or device limitations
of the Nexus One. Nevertheless, we believe these implementations still perform well when used for higher
level applications like P2P content distribution.
6.3 Packet Size
For PIP, the packet size increase in PIP is |RN| · (|σS|+ 320) + 320 bits and the sum of packet increase and
information sent during challenge phase in Log-PIPis 480 + |σS| + 2|σS| log(|RN|) bits, where |RN| is the
number of parents to code over. Recall that |σS| is the size of the validity signature, and depends on the
validity scheme used. For instance, if [BFKW09] is used, we have an increase in PIP of 480 · |RN|+320 bits
and in Log-PIP of 640 + 320 · log(|RN|) bits. As discussed in Section 4, the packet size does not increase
as the payload grows, so such overhead becomes insignificant when transmitting large files.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented two novel protocols, PIP and Log-PIP, for detecting whether a node coded
correctly over all the packets received according to a random linear network coding algorithm. No previous
work defends against such diversity attacks by Byzantine nodes. Our evaluation shows that our protocols
are efficient and the overhead of both of our protocols does not grow with the size of the packet payload.
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